United States Joint Forces Command

The Joint Warfighting Center
Joint Doctrine Series

Pamphlet 6

Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)

27 June 2004

"Response to challenges facing the Nation today most often requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach that brings many diverse skills and resources of the Federal Government and other public and private organizations to bear."

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Preface

This US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) pamphlet, ***Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group***, is part of a ***"Joint Doctrine Series"*** intended to promote doctrinal change based on sound ideas that emerge from the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Program and joint operational experience. The primary purpose of **JWFC Doctrine Pam 6** is to raise awareness, prompt debate, and explore the full potentialities in fielding a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).

The ongoing war on terrorism intensified the need for military activities to be closely aligned with U.S. diplomatic, law enforcement, financial control, and intelligence-sharing endeavors to name a few. In the weeks following "9-11" the Joint Staff gained approval by the Deputies Committee, based on USJFCOM's efforts to enhance interagency planning and coordination at the operational level, to establish a "limited" JIACG capability in each combatant command. With State, Justice and Treasury participation, this interim interagency planning capability has shown great value in prosecuting the war on terrorism while offering numerous spin-off benefits to both military and civilian agencies.

The emerging JIACG concept calls for a team to deal with a full spectrum of actions including peacetime engagement, crisis prevention, major combat operations, and stabilization operations. Based on favorable findings arising from experimentation, USJFCOM has recommended to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) an implementation plan to operationalize the JIACG concept. By prototyping the JIACG concept now, this transformational capability can be given to combatant commands while still allowing refinement to the conceptual model in terms of roles, responsibilities, and relationships.

We welcome your comments and ideas on this important topic. Point of contact for JWFC Pam 6 is Mr. Tom McDaniel, JW2107, 757-686-6147 (DSN 668), william.mcdaniel@.jfcom.mil

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Table of Contents

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Section I – Introduction

"The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed."

The National Security Strategy, September 2002

Joint Context

In *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* we read: "Unless our forces can apply their network-centric capabilities to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, these capabilities will be of little value."[1] And one of the key capabilities needed to achieve these objectives is the capacity to better integrate the instruments of national power. Consequently, this capacity to integrate select instruments will depend on a host of emerging and enabling concepts that need to mature into an operational capability. One such concept is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).


Figure 1 — Integrating the Interagency Community

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[1] *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,* (Wash., DC: Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fall 2003), 34.

This pamphlet describes an organizational capability and its concept of employment within the U.S. Government (USG) interagency community. This organizational solution is a response to the recognized interagency void at the operational level. It offers the combatant commander (CCDR) a new capability for joint operations via the establishment of a combatant command staff element, the JIACG.[2] The pamphlet concludes with a discussion of related concepts and an analysis of the doctrinal implications of this new CCDR staff element.

Background

USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Pam 6 is intended to facilitate changes to joint doctrine based on the results that emerge from the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Program and related joint doctrine development initiatives. **The primary purpose of this pamphlet is to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss doctrinal implications associated with the JIACG**. The stimulus for this topic is the conceptualization and experimentation conducted by USJFCOM J-9 and the potential importance of the JIACG to successful effects-based operations.

USJFCOM has experimented with the interagency-related issues since the Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) Wargame in mid-2000. Major experimentation events have included MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2000 (MC 00) during summer 2000; UNIFIED VISION 2001 (UV 01) during summer 2001; and MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 (MC 02), summer 2002. USJFCOM designed MC 02 to assess the ability of a joint force to execute the RDO warfighting concept in this decade, given a set of enabling and supporting concepts such as the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ (CE)) and the JIACG.

USJFCOM has designated JIACG as a "prototype"—*a model suitable for evaluation of design, performance, and production potential.*[3] JIACG and other prototypes focus on improving near-term (within the next five years) joint warfighting capabilities. Specifically, the JIACG prototype is *an advisory element on the Commander's staff that facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community.*[4] The JIACG conceptual effort also supports the mid-term "challenge" *achieve decision superiority*, an important focus area of USJFCOM's **Concept Development Path**.[5]

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[2] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate, (J9), *A Concept for Improving U.S.Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination*, White Paper Version 1.0, of 4 March 2002.

[3] JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 Apr 01 (as amended through 5 Jun 03).

[4] Ibid, p. 19.

[5] Ibid, p. 23.

The Way Ahead

Although not explicitly stated in any official publication, the JIACG concept and prototype is a transformational capability designed to better enable the conduct of effects-based and network-centric operations. Both these operations derive much of their effectiveness and efficiency from the "the integrated application of selected instruments of national power."[6] The magnitude and rapidity of global change (and its accompanying uncertainty) demands far greater interagency cooperation to gain and sustain United States influence in world events. This fact, coupled with the tyranny of resource constraints, suggests that the interagency community must become more unified in actions, if not in organizational structure. Thus, the JIACG represents yet another evolution in the fusion of interagency capabilities needed to create the synergistic effects mandated in United States' national security strategy.[7]

The JIACG, with its tools, processes and procedures, is an important step in DOD's overall transformation efforts to strengthen its capacity to conduct joint operations. In concert with the Joint Staff J5, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has established and resourced a prototype JIACG to interpret the results of ongoing experimentation and address the concerns of the CCDR provisional JIACGs. From this prototype a baseline concept of employment will describe how the JIACG operates within a combatant command headquarters. This USJFCOM prototype is a first step in an effort to refine this transformational staff element prior to final fielding and implementation.

The current Joint Staff effort to field a permanent JIACG capability for each combatant commander is progressing. Initial feedback during the interim evaluation period, while positive, indicates several areas of common concern across the commands. These concerns include: (1) the lack of secure connectivity with parent agencies that makes it difficult to get timely inputs to JIACG products, (2) the need to stabilize and retain personnel, and (3) agreed on "value added" effectiveness measures to determine if parent agency personnel commitments are worth the investment.

In summary, JIACG development is evolutionary and takes into account the lessons identified from ongoing operations such as the global war on terrorism, the war on drugs, the stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as joint and combined exercises and experiments. In concert with the combatant command implementation of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ-CE), the USJFCOM prototype will deliver to the CCDRs, through a phased implementation as shown in Figure 2, an adaptable organizational template and initial operating capability. This

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[6] *Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (Core Element): Standard Operating Procedure and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 15 April 2004), G-2

[7] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D. C.: The White House, September 17, 2002.)

prototype phase-in ensures the conceptual ideas are rationalized with the lessons learned from the currently fielded JIACGs.

| Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
FY 03	FY 04	FY 07
PACOM	NORTHCOM	**FY 05-06 Phased Implementation**
SOUTHCOM	TRANSCOM	
CENTCOM	STRATCOM	Fully funded Military/Civilian Organization in all combatant commands
EUCOM	SOCOM	
FY 04 funded Civilian Counter-terrorism "Core"	JFCOM-P	
	FY 05 Fielding Decision	

Figure 2 — JIACG Prototype Phased Implementation

Section II – Organization

" Generally, management of the many is the same as the management of the few.
It is a matter of organization."

Sun Tzu

Purpose

The JIACG is a combatant command's designated lead organization for the interagency community providing oversight, facilitation, coordination and synchronization of agencies' activities within the command. It provides each CCDR with a trained and equipped staff element specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of civilian organizations, their relationships and potential contributions to joint operations. Should diplomacy fail, the JIACG also provides a mechanism, through habitual relationships with civilian planners, to expeditiously integrate multi-agency operation planning that implements political-military missions and tasks. In short, the JIACG provides the requisite interagency perspective to the CCDR in both joint planning and operations.

Concept

The JIACG is a multi-functional advisory element on the CCDR staff that facilitates planning, coordination and information sharing across the interagency community. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance the interchange among civilian and military organizations spanning the entire range of national security activity whether expressed by international cooperation or conflict. Accordingly, the JIACG:

- Participates in the combatant commander's peacetime engagement, theater security cooperation, operation planning, and assessment.
- Advises the combatant commander's staff on civilian agency campaign planning and operations.
- Provides perspective on military-civilian planning and policy development.
- Provides civilian agency planning considerations during military contingencies and exercises.
- Informs the combatant commander of civilian agency approaches, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations.

- Establishes habitual relationships and virtual communications links to Washington civilian agency planners as well as those in civilian agencies of international and regional organizations, to include U.S. Ambassadors, chiefs of mission and their staffs.
- Arranges interfaces for planning and rehearsal exercises and other joint operation planning activities.
- Facilitates communications to joint task force (JTF)/component planners and operators regarding interagency issues.

The JIACG is a fully integrated participant within the CCDR's staff that has a daily focus on planning (theater security cooperation, deliberate, crisis, transition, recovery and reconstitution) and operations. It provides each CCDR with a standing capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of civilian agency activity and to keep civilian and military agencies informed of each others efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activity.

In addition, a full-time, fully resourced operational JIACG broadens combatant commander understanding on the range of crisis response options available to each CCDR. If a decision is made to employ a joint force for an intervention, the CCDR can retain the JIACG in place and have the option to integrate selected JIACG members on a JTF staff. But regardless of employment option, the JIACG provides the interagency continuity to the CCDR in planning and operations from pre-crisis through crisis resolution, and post-crisis recovery and reconstitution.

Moreover, the JIACG represents an important capability in the transformation of the joint force. It provides a means to increase CCDR readiness by enhancing the pace and quality of operation planning, coordination, direction and assessment in both the combatant command and JTF headquarters. The JIACG brings an improved capacity to the CCDR to help prevent crises or decisively intervene, as well as recover and reconstitute.

The JIACG is about transformation—thinking and operating differently, using networked systems, employing a truly collaborative interdepartmental approach to planning and operations, and providing a coherent interagency perspective to respond to the operational environment. To this end, the JIACG maintains relationships, leverages technologies and techniques that enable a comprehensive assessment of all external civilian planning and execution activities. This early situational awareness assists the integrated application of instruments of national and multinational power that can influence and shape the environment to either prevent or contain a crisis.

Throughout planning and execution, the JIACG operates within a collaborative information environment (CIE) linked to CCDR staffs, and the broader interagency community for planning, operations, administration, and logistics coordination. The CIE reduces the time for coordination and information sharing, allowing the joint force to operate with a somewhat smaller forward-deployed headquarters. A "warehouse" of data within the CIE allows all involved in crisis resolution to share "24/7" access to the

same information: directives, plans, events, etc. (See JWFC PAM 5, *Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment*, for a more complete explanation of CIE.)

The JIACG also increases command understanding of the operational environment by maintaining current situational awareness and the ability to quickly infuse that awareness into the command and control (C2) structure of a crisis response force. Further, the JIACG coordinates and trains with potential crisis response organizations during periods of peacetime and crisis, employing standard operating procedures for operations within the CCDR's area of responsibility (AOR). This interaction provides for a coordinated effort and reduces the time required to bring a crisis response force to full operational capability. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3— JIACG Concept and Structure

Structure

Under the leadership of a Senior Executive Service (or an equivalent grade) Director, the JIACG is a relatively small staff core element comprised mostly of civilian personnel with extensive interagency experience and who are responsible for formulating, articulating, advocating, and implementing the CCDR's policies, priorities, programs, and procedures. It is envisioned as a staff directorate of 12 personnel located within the headquarters of the combatant command with the capacity to be augmented with virtual or additional collocated members.

The JIACG mission is considerably broader in scope than those already fielded for the global war on terrorism and functions across the full spectrum of interagency activities from routine peacetime engagement, through the pre-crisis period, during actual crisis and the post-crisis phase to restore stability. The JIACG interacts with the Command Group and the CCDR staff directorates on a daily basis. It draws on the command's planning and operations expertise within the headquarters to ensure relevant and timely connections are made with external civilian agencies and activities. The intended result is a fusing of civilian agency operational intentions and capacities into military planning and operations to achieve a harmonization of effort.

In summary, the JIACG organizational design is centered on acquiring, vetting, and managing the flow of information and knowledge to enhance joint planning and operations by offering a broader decision-making context that includes civilian agencies both in Washington and in the AOR. This organizational construct seeks to mitigate drawbacks associated with functional organizations that operate in information "stovepipes." The JIACG is functionally aligned and geographically matrixed so it can operate within a network centric environment that does not limit full cross-functional coordination. This embedded interagency element provides unique capabilities because of its internal relationships within the CCDR staff, its habitual relationships with civilian organizations, its in-depth understanding of the AOR, and its use of a CIE.

Section III – Concept of Employment

"For by wise counsel shalt thou make thy war;
and in multitude of counselors there is safety."

Proverbs, XXIV, 6

As a fully integrated element of the combatant commander's staff, the JIACG serves as the locus for facilitating synchronization of command-wide interagency efforts in theater security planning, deliberate planning, crisis planning, crisis response, transition, and post-crisis recovery and reconstitution activities. The JIACG concentrates on five primary tasks during its daily routines:

- Maintains continuous connectivity with civilian agencies.
- Assists in theater security cooperation planning.
- Collaborates in joint operation planning.
- Supports joint operations.
- Participates in training and exercises.

The JIACG does not replace any civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the combatant commander's staff, such as the Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA, formerly Political-Advisor) or the representative to the Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, responsibilities of agency representatives in the JIACG do not abrogate any current civilian agency relationships to include:

- Extant civilian agency lines of authority and communications.
- Civilian agency concurrence to internal DOD staffing actions, unless specifically authorized by the parent agency.
- Extant Memorandums of Understanding and formalized interagency request processes.
- Use of civilian agency assets in the AOR, unless specifically authorized by the parent agency.

Interagency Connectivity

Establishing and maintaining day-to-day situational awareness is critical to the JIACG and an inherent part of its daily activities. The JIACG closely monitors the

operational and planning environment with the CCDR's Joint Operations Center (JOC), Operations Planning Group (OPG) and Crisis Action Center (CAC), and Joint Planning Group (JPG) when activated, and Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), but does not duplicate the efforts of these organizations.

The JIACG develops and maintains relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations and agencies that can provide specific expertise. These relationships are established through collaboration early in the planning process and become the basis for expanding the JIACG's core capabilities and situational awareness as a crisis develops. A robust, established reachback capability allows the JIACG to maintain these relationships during operations, reducing the need for a large forward C2 footprint. The JIACG is a participant in the CCDR CIE linking the combatant command headquarters with the US Government agencies, CCDR components, and centers of excellence (COEs--including, as appropriate, non-government organizations, academia, and industry) that can expand the requisite knowledge needed for a precise, effects-based response during planning or operations.

Theater Security Cooperation Planning

Through daily coordination, the JIACG core element maintains a comprehensive understanding for potential crises in the AOR, allowing it to make major contributions to the development and execution of the CCDR's Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). The JIACG guided by the TSCP, and in concert with the FPA's linkage to the DOS regional bureau and US Ambassadors in the AOR, ensures the thinking of other Washington agencies, multi-national and international organizations, and non-government entities is identified and integrated into the work of the CCDR staff. The ultimate goal is to establish an enhanced level of cooperation in the theater to prevent a crisis or mitigate its effect.

Joint Operation Planning

During periods of peace, the CCDR provides direction to the JIACG to prioritize its interagency engagements. Selection of these engagements may be driven by any combination of requirements: current events, theater security cooperation activities, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and/or JCS directives, or JIACG insights on Washington policy and planning activities. Given CCDR direction, the JIACG team supports the J5 theater planning efforts to update existing plans, interagency coordination annexes (Annex V) and orders, as well as to develop new plans for crisis prevention. Working with the CCDR staff, JIACG acts as a conduit for coordinated operation planning with its civilian agency partners. Because of its Washington and regional experience and civilian planning perspective, the JIACG is able to recognize early on the potential disconnects with any joint operational plan.

Early and comprehensive planning for transition can be decisive in securing campaign success. The broad U.S. strategic purpose and desired end state focus the

CCDR transition planning efforts. Defining civilian roles and responsibilities help the CCDR staff and the JIACG shape the AOR by ensuring external civilian and multi-agency collaboration and integration within a joint operation. Consequently, the JIACG, working through the CCDR staff, is a major stakeholder in developing the combatant command transition plan.

In today's international security environment the United States will have a wide variety of allies and partners. These organizational relationships will involve extensive coordination and cooperation with multinational forces, government and non-government agencies, international organizations, and/or commercial activities. Therefore, planning for transition needs to begin before or during the developing crisis and continue to iterate throughout crisis resolution.

Transition involves many hand-offs over time. For example, the CCDR might initially have a public security role at the end of hostilities that may be transferred to a UN or international security force which will eventually be assigned to a deployed civilian police force. The anticipation of hand-off responsibilities and timing is needed so task performance does not decline. Again, early identification of transfer tasks and hand-off recipients is essential to mission continuity. The JIACGs will assist in defining and getting agreement on responsibilities that overlap, so the receiving organization is fully performing the task when the transfer is complete.

Because each instrument of government has finite capacity, department and agency actions must be carefully planned in concert to complement each other's tasks in the pursuit of desired operational effects. The JIACG role in coordinating external agency actions is particularly important in the hand-off from the preponderant military phases of the operation to civilian dominated post-conflict phases.

Recovery and reconstitution planning to be coherent and effective also needs to be considered from the start of operation planning. As post-crisis tasks and the universe of donors that contribute to mission accomplishment are identified, these donors need to be integrated into mission rehearsals and exercises as soon as possible.

Joint Operations

Pre-Crisis

Designated members of the JIACG monitor events in the AOR as part of their daily activities. They are responsible for assisting the J3 in the understanding of external agency activities, both in the AOR and in Washington, that impact on current and future operations.

JIACG members augment and are integrated into combatant command and, or JTF boards, centers, and cells during operations. The number and assignment of JIACG members is mission and event dependent, particularly in planning and execution efforts that require multi-agency coordination. Implementation of mission tasks

embodies parallel, simultaneous, multi-agency efforts through time. The JIACG tracks and recommends adjustments to the military tasks in collaboration and coordination with civilian agencies and multinational partners to create and reinforce a unity of effort across all mission areas.

In a developing crisis, the JIACG's knowledge and understanding of the planning and policy objectives at the national level assist the CCDR in developing and recommending a campaign plan that harmonizes military and civilian operational response actions. The daily roles and responsibilities of the JIACG shift to focus on the potential crisis and expand to become an integral part of the overall crisis prevention effort.

The JIACG, through its continuing coordination with external civilian agencies, refines its virtual collaboration by aligning the right membership to support the developing CCDR plans and orders. JIACG crisis response activities and actions facilitate the initial situational awareness of the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and Operations Planning Group (OPG), support Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) and Force Enhancement execution, and make preparation to deploy designated member(s) to the crisis area or forward headquarters as required.

Crisis

The JIACG continues to monitor the evolving situation by maintaining a physical and/or virtual presence in the CCDR JOC and JIC. As required by the contingency, the JIACG augments these centers. Once a situation is identified as a crisis, JIACG members are integrated in the CCDR staff as prescribed in combatant command instructions and directives. The JIACG becomes the responsible staff element for integrating its knowledge and understanding of external agency activities into crisis action planning. Its members respond to and assist in answering information requirements that fill critical agency gaps in the crisis planning effort.

JIACG actions are the most dynamic during transition operations. Its virtual network builds on the previous collaborative planning efforts and adjusts to changing mission tasks. This fact underscores the absolute necessity early on to identify the right civilian agency organizations and participants, engage them in the military plan, surface issues and discontinuities, and get agreement on task responsibility.

As the transition process continues over time, the roles among agencies will likely change as intermediate operational objectives are achieved. These role adjustments will include the transfer of supported and supporting relationships among military and civilian agencies. JIACG collaboration and coordination with external agencies assists the operations team in sorting accountability among the participants at the operational level for execution of multi-functional tasks.

Post-Crisis

The U.S. military has long been involved in post-crisis nation building and will likely continue to be. However, it should not be viewed as the dominant participant in reconstruction efforts. Although military force has a primary role in initially establishing a secure environment, a myriad of civilian actors have a comparative advantage in addressing the wide range of post-crisis reconstitution needs. Non-government organizations, the private sector, international organizations, multilateral banks and civilian agencies from multiple donor nations all have a role in addressing public security, civil administration, governance, justice and reconciliation, economic and social needs.

Post-crisis recovery and reconstitution implementation, like transition, is guided by national security policy objectives. They build on the transition plan and adjust to events on the ground. Moreover, the tasks and accountability among agencies and donors will likely change over time. These role and task adjustments will likely modify supported and supporting relationships among military and civilian, international, private, and commercial agencies and organizations. JIACG habitual relationships and its CIE with external agencies assist the CCDR and JTF operations team in adapting to the changing roles and responsibilities among the participants.

At some point when pre-planned conditions are met, recovery and reconstitution authority will transfer to civilian leadership. This civilian authority should have immediate access to the joint force commander, military logistics, security support and consultations on operation planning and execution. The JIACG role as an interlocutor is substantial. The expanding number of civilian organizations and agencies that will have actual or perceived equities in post-crisis operations will need immediate access to military planning and/or resources for coordinating support requirements.

Training and Exercises

Continuous training and exercise support is essential to the success of the CCDR's readiness to plan for and respond to contingencies. Internal and external training focuses on applying lessons learned, improving use of collaboration and decision support tools, understanding command relationships and improving lines of communication. Peacetime mission-based training improves vertical and horizontal communication, identifies seams and friction points, ensures combat readiness of individual and collective skills in the event of a contingency and develops and maintains key staff and component informational relationships necessary for effective pre-crisis/crisis response planning and execution.

Training takes place not only within the headquarters, but also as part of the CCDR's exercise and engagement activities throughout the AOR. The peacetime integration of the JIACG, and its linkage to external partners, with the CCDR staff provides an opportunity to train together and develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint operations. Training opportunities include:

- Participating in exercises with the CCDR staff, component headquarters, and USG agencies, multinational and international partners. These exercises provide the combatant commander the opportunity to assess the value and currency of the procedures in use, as well as to build stronger relationships among those military commands and external agencies that might be utilized when organizing and responding to contingencies.

- Training the internal staff of the JIACG on processes and procedures for joint operation planning, supported and supporting relationships, CIE usage and external agency coordination and integration with military operations.

- Training selected personnel external to the JIACG on use of communication and collaboration tools to optimize mutually supportive decision support systems between all participating departments and agencies.

- Training external agency partners that would potentially augment JIACG planning and operations. This augmentation may be on-site, virtual, and/or deployed. The training is aimed at developing a coherent team requiring minimum pre-deployment training with emphasis on the CCDR's contingency planning and implementation processes.

During the initial stages of a developing crisis, the combatant commander may direct the CCDR staff to coordinate and participate in crisis specific training. The JIACG is an integral element of this training. This training may range from a small internal staff training exercise to training with a potential JTF and components. The JIACG is responsible for identifying the appropriate external civilian agency participants, surfacing the relevant civilian agency issues, and coordinating the necessary training. Depending on the timeline and venue, this training may be on-site or virtual. Finally, the JIACG continues to conduct internal training as required for individual replacements and augmentation personnel to maintain core skills proficiency.

Section IV – Related Concepts and Capabilities

**"We must consult our means rather than our wishes;
and not endeavor to better our affairs by attempting things,
which, for want of success may make them worse."**

George Washington

Military transformation is well underway and effects-based operations (EBO) are becoming a preferred approach for conducting military operations. In turn, network centric warfare (NCW) is a key enabler of EBO just as the CIE (Collaborative Information Environment) has the potential to be a significant enabler of NCW.[8] And all three concepts benefit greatly from the presence of a JIACG capability.

Effects-based Operations

USJFCOM has defined effects-based operations as "*Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.*"[9] The basic premise of an effects-based approach is that well-crafted policy "ends" are best achieved through the employment of the most effective and efficient interagency "ways and means." Thus the integrated application of select instruments of national power is an essential EBO characteristic. EBO also require a systems approach to understanding the adversary and the operational environment, an established set of desired and undesired system effects, a fully functioning CIE, and a rigorous effects-assessment process. The JIACG is an additional capability that helps the combatant commander orchestrate the use of the right national instruments to attain the desired strategic and operational effects. In short, the military, the other government agencies, and the non-governmental organizations are most influential and effective when their actions are harmonized with each other.

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[8] *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, (Wash., D.C: Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of Force Transformation, Fall 2003), 28.
[9] Standing Joint Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, draft, 25 Jul 03.

Network Centric Warfare

Future conflict will be characterized by the participation of robustly networked forces capable of greater information sharing and situational awareness. In turn, this enhanced informational capacity enables improved collaboration, self-synchronization, sustainability and speed of command. In short, a network centric force--with a shared understanding of the AOR--can better synchronize the ends, ways and means of an operation. And coupling a JIACG to a combatant commander's staff can enlarge the network to include other government and non-government organizations adding unique capabilities to an operation and advancing its chances of success.

Collaborative Information Environment

CIE can be described as a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, equipment, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information and knowledge needed to plan, execute and assess joint force operations and to enable a commander to make decisions better and faster than the adversary. As a component of the Global Information Grid (GIG), the CIE brings specific capabilities to a combatant


Figure 4 — Interagency Collaborative Information Environment

command for the explicit purpose of collaboration. It offers commanders and staffs, including the JIACG, the capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared situational awareness so they can plan and operate with an enhanced unity of effort as envisioned in both effects-based and network centric concepts (see Figure 4). See JWFC Pam 5 for more information on the CIE.[10]

Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)

This new organization—an initiative of the Secretary of Defense—is a full-time, joint, C2 element within the combatant commander's staff. Its daily focus is warfighting readiness, and it is a fully integrated participant in the deliberate and crisis-action plans and operations of the CCDR's staff. The SJFHQ (CE) provides the combatant command with a staffed, trained, and equipped joint C2 capability, specifically designed to enhance situational understanding within designated focus areas. The SJFHQ (CE) exploits new organizational and operational concepts and capabilities to enhance the command's peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the efficient formation of a JTF HQ, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. Considering its planning responsibilities, the SJFHQ (CE) and JIACG will collaborate closely throughout a joint operation. See JWFC Pam 3[11] and the SJFHQ (CE) *Concept of Employment*[12] for more information.

Operational Net Assessment

The SJFHQ (CE) has overall responsibility on the combatant commander's staff for Operational Net Assessment (ONA) development and maintenance. ONA integrates people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves.[13] ONA also is a key contributor to EBO's system perspective of the battlespace. As the name implies, ONA focuses on the operational level; it consists of both process and products intended to significantly enhance both deliberate and crisis-action effects-based planning. ONA considers how we can employ friendly instruments of power to achieve desired effects relative to an adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems. Since the SJFHQ (CE) manages ONA development, it would collaborate closely with the JIACG during this process. See JWFC Pam 4 for more information on the ONA.[14]

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[10] Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 5, *Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE), 1 June 2004.* This document is available on JWFC's web site.

[11] Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3, *Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), 16 June 2003.* This document is available on JWFC's web site.

[12] *Concept of Employment*, USJFCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters Prototype, 25 Jun 03.

[13] USJFCOM J-9 *Operational Net Assessment Concept Primer*, Oct 03. This document is available on JWFC's web site.

[14] Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 4, *Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA), 24 February 2004.* This document is available on JWFC's web site.

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Section V – Doctrinal Implications

**" A doctrine of war consists first in a common way
of objectively approaching the subject…."**

Ferdinand Foch

This section explores some of the joint doctrine implications associated with fielding a JIACG in the combatant commands. Central to this discussion is the question: **Is current joint doctrine sufficient in its treatment of this emerging capability?** From a doctrinal perspective, evaluation of joint prototypes, experimentation results, and lessons learned concentrates on the potential near-term improvements to future joint operations represented by capabilities embedded in a concept. The objective of an evaluation is to determine if these embedded capabilities can fill a doctrinal void, fix a deficiency, reduce risk, improve effectiveness, and/or otherwise add value to extant doctrine.

Again, the JIACG should be viewed as an organizational capability--with products, processes and tools--for the combatant commander to significantly improve the situational awareness of the interagency environment for the expressed purpose of making CCDR joint operation planning and operations more effective.

Current Doctrine

JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed forces of the United States*, is the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine and includes sections on the use of force, interagency operations, and multinational operations. Accordingly, it addresses the employment of the Armed Forces as an instrument of national power describing "joint warfare" as "team warfare." But it does not extend the notion of "team" to the interagency and multinational communities, at least, to the extent envisioned in the EBO and JIACG concepts. More precisely, the "integrated application of selected instruments of power" is not described expansively with regard to the application of the interagency and multinational partners in team warfare.

JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vol. 1& 2, also, does not describe the degree of integration required among the instruments of power to achieve the effects--political, economic, military, etc.—intended in future joint

campaigns. It enumerates the various dimensions of the interagency environment, but does not suggest an organizational or process solution to improved coordination of national and multinational agencies in achieving desired end states.

CJCSI 5715.01A, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs*, clarifies the role of the Joint Staff within the interagency process of US national security policy development and implementation. It describes the organizational structure and responsibilities of key agency participants within both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council systems, but does not explicitly define processes as they pertain to interagency integration.

Listed below are the specific documents related to the salient aspects of a JIACG and referenced in current doctrine (to include those more important publications cited above).

- JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed forces of the United States*, 14 Nov 00
- JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vol. 1& 2, Sep 03
- JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 Feb 01
- JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 5 Sep 03
- JP 3-07.4*, Joint Doctrine for Counter Drug Operations*, 17 Feb 98
- JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995
- JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, 25 January 2002
- CJCSI 5715.01A, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs*, 13 November 2003

Future Perspective

The Draft JIACG Initial Concept of Operations, Prototype Version 1.0 states, "…the JIACG serves as the locus for coordination and synchronization of command-wide interagency efforts in theater security planning, deliberate planning, crisis planning, transition and post-crisis reconstruction activities." At this stage of concept development, the most ill-defined issues cluster around the explicit authorities and responsibilities of the JIACG. While the interagency community seems to recognize that the JIACG is a legitimate information coordination body, no consensus has been reached as to the boundaries of their decision-making authority other than they are not empowered to make policy, task or prioritize agency efforts, unilaterally commit agency resources, or to execute plans. In brief, the scope of JIACG authorities and responsibilities is currently limited to the direct support of a combatant commander's mission.

Presently, the preponderance of JIACG responsibility is in the planning domain from pre-crisis theater security preparations to post-crisis recovery and reconstitution. They are the primary group that facilitates the harmonization of combatant command plans with interagency plans, policies, and resources. The intention is for the JIACG to keep the CCDR informed on government-wide policy and planning initiatives so the

CCDR can match plans and capabilities to the ever-evolving AOR security requirements—to preclude a crisis vice react to one.

Although largely focused on planning, the JIACG can recommend how to de-conflict divergent interdepartmental policies to generate cohesive operations. This de-confliction will eventually have to translate into interagency integration, at least, with regard to joint operation planning. The principal purpose of the JIACG, again, is to enable the achievement of desired national security objectives and effects through the integrated application of select instruments of national power.

Because the JIACG is on the periphery of policy development at the highest level of government, the ability to create an effective and efficient CCDR staff organization will be particularly challenging. The level of trust within the interagency community will be crucial to the quality of information the JIACG can provide the combatant commander. This trust—manifested by the willingness of an individual agency to share information—will ultimately determine the ability to "field" a successful JIACG as envisioned in the concept.

The following is an encapsulation of major experimentation findings.

- The JIACG has the potential to harmonize civilian and military operational plans as bounded by national policy decisions and guidance. While policy decisions do not easily lend themselves to temporal synchronization with operational planning, the JIACG can facilitate the adjustment of operational plans in order to bring them into significant agreement with strategic policy guidance, even when newly minted.

- The JIACG acts as a coordinating organization between the strategic and operational levels and as such should be embedded in the combatant commander's staff.

- For the JIACG to be effective, a friendly and reliable CIE must to be accessible to each participating agency or organization. (Policy-makers may not be as comfortable with virtual communication, preferring "face to face" interaction that allows a personal "handshake" to consummate agreement.)

- The composition of the JIACG—its personnel makeup—needs to be tailored to the specific requirements of the geographic or functional combatant command. For example, the SOUTHCOM JIACG might have more DOJ positions than EUCOM, if its CCDR wished to emphasize drug enforcement, while the EUCOM CCDR might have more multinational positions.

- Rapid and decisive military operations should be matched (as closely as possible) with a rapid and decisive national policy determination process. Although the processes and products for military operations and policy formulation are inherently different in substance and durability, the JIACG

must have clearly defined authorities, roles and responsibilities that can inform the CCDR about the constraints/restraints of his courses of action.

In evaluating the JIACG concept, its doctrinal implications must also be tied to its relationships to other emerging and enabling concepts and prototypes within the joint community. Here are some of those findings.

- The JIACG represents a modest start to transforming the joint and interagency arena to achieve policy aims using the integrated application of select instruments of power. The orchestration of the various instruments goes beyond merely departmental de-confliction and aims at substantive integration of interagency actions to attain the desired diplomatic, military and economic effects and end states.

- By establishing an organizational element on the combatant commander's staff, the joint community will have significantly better access to planning and policy development in civilian agencies. At a minimum this access will give the CCDR the opportunity to gain a more complete understanding of higher headquarters guidance, improving the articulation of commander's intent in terms of purpose, end states and risks.

- Undeniably, a crucial enabling concept for the JIACG is CIE which has not reached full operational capability. The capacity to communicate and collaborate at the strategic and operational levels is requisite to creating an interagency environment that fosters timely cohesive action among the various instruments of power. To the extent possible this CIE needs to fully replicate the intimacy of "eye to eye" dialogue between senior political and military interlocutors, even when the participants are asynchronously separated in location and time. In addition, both effects-based operations (EBO) and network centric warfare (NCW) concepts require a broader and multifaceted view of the battlespace that is best achieved through an interagency perspective.

Conclusions

Particularly with JROC endorsement of the JFCOM JIACG Transformational Change Package, sufficient justification exists for the Joint Doctrine Development Community to monitor closely the JIACG concept, JIACG field-testing, and other JIACG implementation efforts in order to assess the impact on joint doctrine and revise affected JPs accordingly.

Even so, the JIACG is not sufficiently mature to be incorporated more than cursorily in joint doctrine. (For example, in a doctrine publication the organization could be identified by name as an element of a combatant commander's staff, but the publication would not describe its functions and processes in detail.) Furthermore, a number of challenges could affect the ability to execute the JIACG to the full degree that

the concept envisions. This situation could change as the JIACG concept is refined, field-tested and supported by senior leaders with resource allocation authority.

If the full set of JIACG required capabilities existed (including multinational protocols), and if the JIACG were eventually approved for implementation throughout the joint community, several joint doctrine publications would be affected, including:

- JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed forces of the United States*
- JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 2-01*, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*
- JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
- JP 3-08, Vols. I & II, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*
- JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
- JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*
- JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*

Finally, the JIACG, in its essence, is a nascent organizational solution to the perennial challenge of coordinating interagency activities. As such, its longer-term doctrinal implications will depend more on the effectiveness of its processes than on its mere presence on a CCDR staff. To the extent the JIACG can foster greater cooperation within the interagency culture, doctrine will document and institutionalize its more important contributions.

Glossary

Part 1 — Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
CAT	crisis action team
CCDR	combatant commander
CIE	collaborative information environment
COA	course of action
COE	center of excellence
CONEMP	concept of employment
CONOPS	concept of operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
EBO	effects-based operations
FDO	Flexible Deterrent Options
FPA	Foreign Policy Advisor
GIG	Global information Grid
HQ	headquarters
IWS	InfoWorkSpace
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	joint force commander
JIC	joint intelligence center
JOC	joint operations center
JP	joint publication
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM	Joint Requirements Oversight Council memorandum
JS	joint staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	joint task force
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
NCW	network centric warfare
OPLAN	operation plan
SJFHQ	Standing Joint Forces Headquarters
ONA	Operational Net Assessment
OPG	Operations Planning Group
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
TSCP	Theater Security Cooperation Plan
USG	United States Government
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

Part 2 — Terms and Definitions

collaborative information environment (CIE). The integration of individuals, organizations, systems, and processes for the common purpose of creating and sharing the data, information, and knowledge necessary to rapidly plan, execute, and assess joint operations.

effects-based operations (EBO). Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims. [*Draft Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (Core Element): Standard Operating Procedure and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,* (15 April 2004)]

joint interagency coordination group (JIACG). A multifunctional advisory group composed of US Government (USG) civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and typically located with the combatant command headquarters. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

network centric warfare (NCW). A conflict characterized by the participation of at least one robustly networked force capable of greater information sharing and situational awareness that enables enhanced collaboration, self-synchronization, sustainability and speed of command to produce a dramatic increase in mission effectiveness. [Composite statement from basic tenets In *Network Centric Warfare: Department of Defense Report to Congress* (July 27, 2001)]

operational net assessment (ONA). The integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves.

standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ). A full-time, joint, (C2) element that is part of the CCDR's staff.

" Communications dominate war; broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military."

Mahan